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ABSTRACT

The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm promises to make “things” include a more generic set of
entities such as smart devices, sensors, human beings, and any other IoT objects to be accessible
at anytime and anywhere. IoT varies widely in its applications, and one of its most beneficial
uses is in the medical field. However, the large attack surface and vulnerabilities of IoT systems
needs to be secured and protected. Security is a requirement for IoT systems in the medical field
where the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) applies.

This work investigates various applications of IoT in healthcare and focuses on the security
aspects of the two internet of medical things (IoMT) devices: the LifeWatch Mobile Cardiac
Telemetry 3 Lead (MCT3L), and the remote patient monitoring system of the telehealth provider
Vivify Health, as well as their implementations.

INDEX WORDS: Cybersecurity, Internet of Things, IoT, Internet of Medical Things, HIPAA
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Chapter 0: Research Goal, Methodology, and Contributions

The research goal is to understand, identify, and analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities in
the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) devices, and provide an analysis of solutions to the issues
identified from a cybersecurity perspective. Through the investigation of the Mobile Cardiac
Telemetry 3 Lead and the remote patient monitoring kit from Vivify Health, a critical analysis of
security issues and potential solutions is presented to reach the research goal.

IoMT is a growing application of IoT technology. It directly improves the quality of life of
patients and eases the burden on healthcare providers. IoMT consists of IoT devices specifically
developed to meet the needs of patients and healthcare facilities. IoMT is developed for remote
patient monitoring, intensive care, and context awareness, which gathers information about a
patient’s environment. IoMT can also be utilized beyond direct patient treatment, such as
medical equipment and medication management.

I have conducted investigative analysis of two IoMT devices, the Mobile Cardiac Telemetry 3
Lead (MCT3L) and the remote patient monitoring kit from Vivify Health. I have formulated a
series of questions to meet the research goal. These questions serve as the basis for the analysis
of the IoMT environment. I met with a local hospital that provided the MCT3L User Guide,
which contained the specifications for the MCT3L. I also met with Wellstar Home Health for a
demonstration of the remote patient monitoring kit from Vivify Health. The information gathered
from these sources provided me with the information to conduct analyses to fulfill the research
goal.
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My contributions to the field include the analysis of real IoMT devices, their threats and
vulnerabilities, and solutions to further protect them. Furthermore, the work in this thesis
illustrates the lacking security countermeasures found in IoMT devices currently deployed. This
work contributes to the IoMT literature by conducting a thorough investigation of specific
devices, the MCT3L, and the remote patient monitoring kit. The IoMT security literature is
lacking in thorough technical examination of devices that are currently deployed. This work
provides details of IoMT devices and the security risks they impose, along with a comprehensive
analysis of possible solutions. These solutions consist of using secure communication protocols,
using multi-factor authentication for user equipment, understanding the device manufacturer’s
role in security, implementing robust security policies and procedures organization wide,
utilizing network hardening techniques and network segmentation, providing IoMT security
training and education, using lightweight security protocols, and using blockchain and cloud
computing technologies.

15
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Internet of Things (IoT)

This chapter introduces the internet of things and its concepts and definitions. The background,
applications, and elements of IoT are explored in this chapter. The basic concepts that make up
an IoT system are discussed in-depth, which provides a foundation for the security issues and
other challenges discussed in this thesis.

1.1 Definition and Background

The internet of things is a phrase that refers to the interconnectivity of physical objects to each
other over networks [1]. There is not one standard definition that describes the internet of things,
so using Cisco’s definition, IoT refers to the fact that more physical devices, such as
smartphones, are connected to the internet than people are [2]. These objects are able to collect
and exchange information through communication protocols of existing network infrastructure.
Ideally, IoT devices use sensors to collect and transmit information without human intervention,
an intended seamless and hands-off process [1]. IoT is intended to give objects communication
capability to make automated and smart decisions using the information collected and
exchanged. IoT bridges together many different technologies to provide new and efficient
applications [1]. How it works varies across its many uses, which is one of IoT’s weaknesses.

The internet of things lacks a standard definition and body of standards [3]. IoT is heterogenous,
meaning that there are many different technologies and implementations depending on its
purpose. There is a ubiquitous number of languages and protocols in IoT, making it more
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difficult for standardization [3].

The phrase “the internet of things” was coined by Kevin Ashton in 1999 at MIT while
developing radio frequency identification (RFID) technology [2]. Kevin Ashton referred to RFID
as a precursor to IoT and believed that computers could keep track of and manage devices tagged
with RFID sensors [4]. A modern example of this concept is quick response (QR) codes, digital
barcodes that store information. The first ever internet-enabled appliance was a Coke machine at
Carnegie Mellon University in 1982 [5]. The machine could detect the inventory and whether or
not the drinks were cold [5]. While IoT existed as early as 1982, IoT technology did not come to
full fruition until sometime between 2008 and 2009 [2]. Since then, the number of IoT devices
has boomed. In Figure 1.1 below we can see just how many devices are connected to the internet
compared to the world population.

Figure 1.1: The Internet of Things Was “Born” Between 2008 and 2009 [2]
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Looking at Figure 1.1, the number of connected devices increased by twenty-four times in the
span between 2003 and 2010. To understand this boom, it is important to look at the evolutionary
path of the internet. Gokhale, et al. [5] describe five eras of the internet: the internet of
documents, the internet of commerce, the internet of applications, the internet of people, and
finally the internetof things. Each step relates to an advancement of the internet’s capability and
function. Beginning with simple document pages on the web, the internet advanced to commerce:
shopping, banking, stock trading, etc.

Then the internet evolved where any user could create and participate on the world wide web,
creating websites or writing blogs. The internet of people mainly refers to social media, people
creating personal profiles and connecting with each other. Finally, we are at the internet of
things, where physical, ordinary objects are given internet and communication capability. Since
such a ubiquitous number of devices are connected, it is important to understand the many
applications of IoT, and why it is a rapidly growing field of technology.

1.2 The Applications of IoT

The purpose of the internet of things, like most technology, is to make daily life easier and more
efficient. This efficiency can be seen in many fields that utilize IoT. Today, IoT is a part of
almost everything. Modern vehicles for example, use computer and communication systems that
provide essential functions like engine performance and safety sensors [2]. Modern buildings use
connectivity to control functions like heating, venting, air conditioning, security, lighting, etc.
[2].
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Some of the most common household IoT devices include voice and app-controlled devices such
as Amazon Echo and Google Home. These devices are used for home automation that enable the
user to effortlessly complete simple tasks such as turning on lights, ordering food, setting a timer,
etc. The technology of IoT certainly makes daily life easier for individuals, but its real utility and
significance exists in its uses for the broader society, such as industrial and infrastructural
functions, like monitoring power grids and sending important information to utility workers [6].
Entire cities can use IoT to improve lives by measuring certain things such as air quality, traffic
control, and increase small conveniences such as monitoring available parking spaces in a public
area [6]. The applications range far and wide in society, ranging from smart home appliances to
smart agriculture. The uses of IoT are not limited to a particular industry or function; it is only
limited by the imagination.

One of the most impactful applications of IoT is in healthcare. IoT in healthcare is extremely
important because it directly improves the quality of life of patients. The ways in which IoT can
be applied in the medical field alone is growing exponentially. Smart pill boxes can detect how
many pills are left and send reminders to their smart phone, a glucometer can detect glucose
levels and send the information to an insulin pump to automatically dispense insulin, a monitor
can be sent home with a patient to measure heart rate, blood pressure, oxygen levels, etc. Patient
information can be collected and sent to healthcare provider who can review it remotely and
make decisions from looking at the biometric data.

IoT is also emerging as an extremely lucrative field. Indeed, according to Von See, [7] the global
IoT market was worth an astonishing $389 billion in 2020 and is expected to grow over one
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trillion USD in 2030. The consumer market holds the highest share at thirty-five percent [7].
Consumer IoT goods like smart watches, smart phones, smart appliances, and more recently,
smart cars, top the charts in IoT development [7]. This number is also expected to grow to fortyfive percent by 2030, and the total number of IoT devices globally is expected to triple in this
time [7].

1.3 The Elements of IoT

A device, system, or application considered has a few things that make it specifically a part of the
IoT environment. All IoT devices communicate with other devices or objects a part of the IoT
environment where they send and receive information, process it, and present it through a
program or application.

The basic building blocks of IoT include sensors that gather information about the environment,
networks and gateways for information transmission, middleware which allows the components
in the IoT devices to “talk” to each other when they otherwise would not be able to, a data
processing and storage mechanism (e.g., the cloud), and finally a user interface which allows an
end user to review the information [5]. These building blocks make up an IoT platform, but vary
wildly in their implementation, purpose, and scope (i.e., IoT is heterogenous). Figure 1.2 below
illustrates the key aspects of an IoT system.
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Figure 1.2: IoT Key Building Blocks [8]

While those are some of the basic building blocks, Burhan, et al., [9] provide additional elements
of IoT. These elements are identification, computation, services, and semantics. Each IoT object
must be able to identify in the IoT system through naming and addressing processes [9]. An
example of a naming process is using electronic product codes, whereas an addressing scheme is
completed through IPv4 or IPv6 which provides a unique address [9]. More than one device may
share a name, but each device has its own unique address [9].

For the computation element, the information gathered from IoT devices is filtered by some
computational means, removing superfluous or irrelevant data [9]. For IoT software, the
operating system (OS) plays a significant role in computation [9]. The services element refers to
the services provided by the IoT application [9]. There are four service types: identity service,
information aggregation, collaborative service, and ubiquitous service [9].
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Identity service refers to the identity request sent by IoT objects [9]. There are two types of
identification: active and passive [10]. Active identification process relies on a continuously
powered device (e.g., battery powered) that broadcasts information [10]. Passive identification is
powerless and relies on an external reader and electromagnetic field to gather information, such
as a powerless RFID tag that requires a reader in order to transmit data [10]. Information
aggregation collects and process all the information gathered and transmits it to the application
[9]. The collaborative service makes decisions based on the information aggregated and sends
the response to the IoT devices [9]. Finally, the ubiquitous service executes the response
command immediately and seamlessly in the IoT system [9]. Semantics in IoT generally refers to
the interoperability of IoT systems while automatically providing clear meaning of the data [11].
Figure 1.3 below illustrates the elements and cycle of an IoT system.

Figure 1.3: Elements of an IoT System [9]
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While the foundational aspects of one IoT system remains similar to others, it varies with its
application. For example, an IoT system that is implemented for more efficient farming by
timing irrigation using sensors to detect moisture levels will have a different architecture and
function differently than an IoT system implemented for sensing biometric data in a patient, such
as blood sugar levels, and automatically dispensing insulin through an insulin pump. While the
IoT agricultural system may use simple sensors such as radio frequency identification tags to
detect soil pH and moisture and send that information through an RFID reader, the biometric IoT
system may use an implant sensor for blood sugar sensing, a pressure cuff with an embedded
sensor for blood pressure, and a weight scale with Bluetooth capability that uses an entirely
different suite of protocols from the agricultural system.

Additionally, those that collect the data may do so in a variety of ways. The agriculturist may use
a local data processing and storage system to collect and view the information, whereas the
healthcare provider may utilize cloud services to process and store the electronic protected health
information (ePHI). So, while the function is similar (sensing the environment, processing/
storing, and viewing the data), the method in which the entire IoT system operates is vastly
different.

This is the heterogeneity of IoT; different components, hardware, software, protocols, tools, and
services utilized in the entire process depending on its purpose. While this is not necessarily a
negative thing, it is important to recognize that it does lead to challenges within the IoT
environment regarding cybersecurity, standardization, and efficiency. It becomes more tedious
and difficult to apply security practices that sufficiently protect different devices, suites of
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protocols, and applications. For example, the same encryption method for data cannot be applied
to every IoT system. Bluetooth encryption methods may vary from encryption that cellular
networks or WiFi use.

In addition, the efficiency and goal of the IoT system is important for determining what type of
IoT components to use. Going back to the agriculture example, an extremely low power device
that uses simple protocols may not be able to manage the substantial amounts of data gathered
from acres upon acres of farmland and may lack the processing power for any encryption
methods. There are numerous aspects of the IoT system to consider for users. Is security more
important than efficiency for its purpose? Is it important that the device has a powerful battery
and long battery life? Is it necessary to use a flexible and scalable storage system like the cloud?
These are just a few basic questions that scratch the surface of IoT capability.
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Chapter 2: The Architecture of IoT

This chapter explains the specific architecture of IoT systems: all the layers of IoT and how they
operate. The building blocks of IoT systems are expanded upon and illustrated. The details of
specific communication systems, such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), Wireless Personal
Area Networks (WPANs), and Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) are discussed. These
wireless systems vary in architecture and function but are all considered systems of IoT. A brief
overview of cloud services for IoT is discussed, and finally some general challenges to IoT are
presented.

2.1 The Structure and Layers of IoT

The elements of IoT were previously discussed, so understanding how those elements work to
build the structure and architecture of IoT is necessary. It is worth noting that there is not a single
standard architecture of IoT, rather there are many designs of IoT architecture that fit the
purpose. Like the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model in a networking system, IoT has
conceptual architectures that function similarly. The most common architectures are the threelayer, service-oriented, and five-layer models [3].

The three-layer model consists of three essential layers: the perception layer, the network layer,
and the application layer [3]. The perception layer is also referred to as the physical layer
because this contains the tangible devices and sensors embedded within that allow the
architecture to exist [3]. The physical sensors or devices that gather the information about the

25
environments are a part of the perception layer. They interact with the environment around them
and have computing power that make them “smart” [12].

The network layer is responsible for communication between the physical devices, sending and
receiving information collected through either a wired or wireless connection to the application
layer [3]. This layer transports the information gathered from the perception layer through certain
protocols [12]. There are a vast number of protocols and communication technologies that IoT
uses, so it is important to consider the efficiency and security before deployment. The application
layer provides the applications and services of the IoT system [3]. The functionality of IoT is
performed in the application layer [12]. Data processing, analyzing, and presentation occurs in
this layer [12]. The data from previous layers is made available to the actual application running
the IoT device (e.g., the smart car) [12]. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the three- layer IoT
architecture.

Figure 2.1: Three-layer IoT Architecture [13]
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The service-oriented architecture (SoA) has the same three layers with a service layer between
the network and application layer. This architecture revolves around the services of IoT
applications and provides service discovery, service composition, service management, and
service interfaces in the service layer [12]. The SoA provides dynamic data retrieval and service
discovery, the process of locating service requests in an efficient manner [12]. Service
composition is used for connecting the devices and getting the requests [12]. Service
management manages the requests and interprets them [12]. Service interfaces allows for
interoperability between services [12].

The SoA is popular in enterprise systems because of its cost-effectiveness and the reusability of
hardware and software [5]. The service layer also provides application programming interfaces
(APIs) that provide the service interface to end users, i.e., how people see and interact with the
data [5]. Figure 2.2 below shows an example of an SoA.

Figure 2.2: Service-oriented Architecture [13]
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The five-layer architecture consists of the three-layers from the three-layer model, with
additional layers of the middleware layer between the network and application layers, and the
business layer on top of the application layer. The middleware layer is especially important for a
large IoT environment that contains multiple different communication technologies. The
middleware layer is responsible for taking all the information gathered from IoT devices that use
different communication methods and with it, different suites of protocols (e.g., Bluetooth and
ZigBee) [12].

Middleware is software or a service that formats and processes the information sent through a
gateway for the application to understand the vast amount of data coming through from various
IoT sources [12]. Essentially, middleware bridges the gap between the network and application
layers and allows the different technologies in IoT to be compatible with one another. The
business layer is relatively straightforward, it is the layer for retrieving and managing data to
assist with business management [14]. The data from IoT concerns business goals and is useful
for answering important questions, so the business layer refers to the usefulness and analysis of
the data [14]. Figure 2.3 illustrates the five-layer model.
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Figure 2.3: The Five-Layer IoT Architecture [15]

These models are the most common models of IoT. There are numerous architectures of IoT, as
each one can be implemented to fit the needs of the business or organization. IoT is an extremely
flexible networking system that provides practical functionality in virtually any field for any
purpose. The heterogeneity of IoT architecture introduces standardization and communication
challenges, leading to the further development of technology such as middleware.

2.2 Key Technologies of IoT

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a key technology of IoT. WSNs are the foundation for
IoT, interconnected sensors sending and receiving information. WSNs are lossy networks that
provide wireless communication between small sensors, referred to as nodes, which connect to a
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central node or gateway to route the traffic to the internet [16]. WSNs are implemented for large
scale event and environment monitoring. The WSN architecture consists of sensor nodes,
gateway, and the user [16]. WSNs typically consist of low-power and resource constrained
devices that serve a simple purpose, such as sensing temperature and forwarding that information
through the gateway. A simple WSN model is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below.

Figure 2.4: WSN Model [16]

The sensor nodes of a WSN usually have a limited broadcast range, so the placement of the
nodes is important for sensing and retrieving accurate data. The nodes of a WSN can use
different network topologies, such as linear, star, or mesh [16]. Even though the sensor node is
resource constrained, it still has sufficient processing and computing power [16]. The sensor
nodes must also have a power source, this is usually through battery power, although they can be
powered with means such as solar or thermoelectric [16]. The sensors spend most of the time in a
hibernation state, only waking up and consuming power when they are actively collecting,
sending, or receiving information [16]. WSNs use communication methods like Bluetooth,
ZigBee, and 6LoWPAN, which will be discussed in-depth later.
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WPANs, a similar communication system to WSNs, take the interconnectedness of sensors
spanning a distance, and shorten it to the environment of the human personal space [17]. WPANs
often use the same protocols as WSNs – Bluetooth, ZigBee, etc. Some of the common devices
that make up WPANs are laptops, smartphones, headphones/earbuds, speakers, printers, etc.
WPANs encapsulate all the wireless technology around an individual or space. WPANs are
flexible and low cost but provide lower coverage and data rates [17]. Figure 2.5 below illustrates
aWPAN environment.

Figure 2.5: WPAN Environment [18]

WBANs are like WPANs but monitor conditions in or directly around the human body [19].
WBANs are most implemented for medical purposes, like implants or wearable devices to sense
and record biometric data, but its applications also extend beyond the medical field. WBANs can
be applied to athletes to measure heart rate, temperature, respiration rate, etc. to analyze the data
and improve performance to gain a competitive edge and increase fitness. WBANs are crucial
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for the evolution of healthcare and an integral part of IoT for patient monitoring. Some common
consumer WBAN devices are wearables such as Fitbit and other smart watches, namely Apple
Watch and Samsung watches. Figure 2.6 below illustrates the WBAN environment.

Figure 2.6: WBAN Environment [19]

WSNs, WPANs, and WBANs are interchangeable communication systems that use similar
protocols. They can all be implemented in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes and are
critical to IoT functionality. They remain flexible, low-power, and low-cost options for sensing
and wireless communications. While they can be implemented in several ways, there are
challenges such as low fault tolerance, security vulnerabilities, and channel interference. These
will be discussed in-depth further. Currently, one of the necessary and growing tools in IoT for
data processing, security, storing, and management is the cloud.
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2.3 Overview of Cloud Computing and IoT Services in the Cloud

The cloud is a large network of servers that provide services for anyone that needs it. The cloud
is a flexible, scalable platform that offers many services and solutions to modern IT
environments. The cloud can be used for data storage, streaming services, application
development, and plenty more. The cloud works by outsourcing physical equipment, such as
servers, from a local environment to a cloud provider, notable ones being Amazon Web Services
(AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud.

The cloud providers have access to a large network of servers across the globe that can be
accessed by anyone who needs the service. Most cloud providers use a pay-as-you go model,
charging by usage, so an organization that cannot afford the network infrastructure and
maintenance on-site may choose to use a cloud service and pay for services by usage. There are
three primary service categories that the cloud offers: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS),
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).

IaaS allows access to servers, storage, and general networking infrastructure that users can
configure. The cloud provider manages all the hardware. IaaS is beneficial for reducing costs in
an on-site IT environment where resources can be scaled up and down depending on need.

PaaS provides users with the means to develop and run applications. The cloud provider
manages most of the resources in PaaS, including the software, operating system, middleware,
etc. PaaS is mostly beneficial to application developers who can easily build, test, and run
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applications in the PaaS. SaaS is the most popular and widely used cloud service option. SaaS is
completely managed and operated by the cloud provider and the end user can access the software
on any internet-connected device. SaaS is beneficial for streaming and subscription services,
some of the most popular being Amazon Prime, Netflix, and Spotify. Figure 2.7 illustrates the
differences between on-premises, IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS.

Figure 2.7: On-Premises, IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS [20]

The cloud can be used for many different services, one of those being IoT. Since an IoT
environment collects an enormous amount of data from information aggregation, the cloud has
become a popular and convenient service for IoT. The cloud is commonly used for big data
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storage and providing applications for IoT devices. All three services can be used for IoT
systems and provide effective services. IaaS can be used for big data storage and scale the needs
for IoT. PaaS can be used for IoT application development and application programming
interfaces. SaaS can be used to quickly access software relevant to the IoT device.
An IoT environment is not required to use the cloud, but the cloud makes an IoT system much
more effective. For example, data gathered from a smart farm in one location of the U.S. can be
compared to data gathered from another location in the U.S. to draw insights to improve
agriculture development. The information collected from sensors in smart farms, such as soil,
pH, temperature, humidity, etc., can be stored in the cloud and provide access to users.

Without the cloud storage, being able to compare and access the data of the different locations
would be extremely difficult. The cloud improves the efficiency of IoT, which ultimately
improves the lives of many. The storage can also be scalable, upgrading the needs of storage if
more sensors are placed or more smart farms are added as IoT environments. Cloud storage also
shifts the burden of storage from the resource constrained devices to the cloud. As briefly
mentioned earlier, IoT devices are often low-power, low-activity devices that cannot afford to
expend much energy beyond their direct purpose. This mostly concerns the sensing devices in an
IoT environment that use simple communication protocols rather than resource heavy TCP/IP
communication. While the cloud is a powerful tool for IoT, it does not solve every problem with
it.
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2.4 Key Challenges in IoT

Some challenges in IoT have been mentioned previously, such as heterogeneity – the diversity of
devices and protocols that limit interoperability. Security, privacy, ownership of information,
encryption, access control, authorization, authentication, and lack of standardizations are all
challenges an IoT environment faces. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the core
tenets of cybersecurity in computer and network systems. The same is true for IoT systems.

Confidentiality ensures that all information and data remain confidential; that only the trusted
devices and parties are able to access and view information. Integrity refers to the accuracy of
the information. It is important that all information in an IT environment remains unaltered and
unaffected; the information that was sent needs to be the same information that is received. If
any information from point A to point B is altered or lost, there was a lack of integrity.
Availability refers to the accessibility of information. The information needs to be accessible by
authorized parties at any point in time. This also encompasses data backup and recovery, if
information is somehow lost, there needs to be methods in place to retrieve it.

It is necessary for all devices and components in IoT to be able to communicate quickly and
effectively with one another, but it is also necessary that the communication between devices is
trusted and verified, i.e., the device must be who it says it is. A device not a part of the IoT
environment that can monitor the traffic between IoT devices or even connect itself between
communications as a trusted device is a major concern. This is known as a man-in-the- middle
(MITM) attack and if IoT security is not sufficient, a bad actor could effortlessly see all the
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transmission data between devices. An external device being able to view the transmission data
already violates confidentiality of the IoT environment. The data could be stolen and held for
ransom, known as ransomware. Some of the most concerning security threats in IoT are MITM
attacks, ransomware, Denial of service (DoS) attacks, and phishing.

The heterogeneric nature of IoT can make it difficult to choose an efficient architecture and
implementation method. While middleware helps standardize communication and data transfer,
the devices must be compatible in the environment. For example, simple sensors detecting
temperature must be able to transmit that information over some protocol to another device or
gateway, which must be able to receive and transmit the data without altering it. The ‘language
barrier’ of IoT can be an issue in some cases.

There is also the challenge of encryption. The data that is transmitted in the IoT environment
should have encryption methods to protect the data at rest and in transit. The main issue with
encryption is that it can potentially consume a lot of power and resources from the IoT devices, if
they are even capable of encryption [21]. In the healthcare sector, encryption is paramount
because of the sensitivity of data being recorded and transmitted. In healthcare, extremely
personal data is being collected and sent over communication channels. Personal data such as
heart rate, weight, blood pressure, blood oxygen levels, glucose levels, etc. can be all collected
by internet of medical things (IoMT) devices. It is important to ensure secure transmission
because of compliance regulations such as HIPAA. These challenges will be addressed in-depth
with the analysis of the LifeWatch Mobile Cardiac Telemetry 3 Lead device and the remote
patient monitoring system of Vivify Health.
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Chapter 3: The Purpose of IoT in Healthcare

This chapter introduces IoMT uses and applications for healthcare. IoMT can be used to provide
quality care remotely which eases the burden of healthcare facilities and staff. Patients can
receive quality care while in the comfort and freedom of their homes and communities. IoT is
also beneficial for in-patient care, since many tasks that would require physical intervention
(e.g., gathering vital signs) can be automated. The purpose of IoMT is to make patient care
simpler and more efficient for the people involved.

3.1 Monitoring Patient Data to Enhance Quality of Care

Since IoT is a collection of sensors to monitor the environment, the environment can include
human physiology. Physiological readings – also referred to as biometric data – can be sensed,
recorded, and transmitted through IoMT devices for the purposes of patient care. According to
Nausheen, et al. [22], there are three categories of IoMT applications: clinical care, remote
monitoring, and context awareness. IoMT in clinical care refers to patients who are in intensive
care units and require on-going monitoring to provide information to clinical staff about the
progress of their condition [22].

In certain cases, it is more beneficial for a patient to be monitored with IoMT devices remotely
from their home. Remote patient monitoring (RPM) allows hospitals and other healthcare
facilities to make the decision of admitting patients or sending them home to use RPM for further
monitoring if it is safe to do so. Thus, freeing up a room for a future patient who may require
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inpatient care while still providing service and care to the remote patient. This application
commonly used for patients with chronic conditions or diseases [22]. Context awareness refers to
gathering information about a patient and their environment and understanding the affect an
environment may have to a patient’s circumstances [22]. For example, a smart device could
detect low air quality in a patient’s environment and send alerts to a healthcare provider if the air
quality is affecting the patient’s respiration.

There are also different ways to monitor patients. IoMT devices include sensors that attach to the
human body but can also include wearables and implantable devices. Wearables are devices that
a patient can wear, such as a watch, that is integrated with IoMT. An implantable device is a
device that can be inserted into the human body. An example of an implantable device is a
pacemaker. Pacemakers can now be integrated with the IoMT environment to provide instant
information about a patient’s cardiac rhythm and overall heart health.

The vulnerable population, i.e., children, the elderly, and those with chronic conditions benefit
the most from IoMT and specifically remote monitoring. RPM also provides a personalized
treatment plan that encourages patient/doctor interaction [22]. RPM also allows healthcare
providers to know if a patient is following their treatment plan and regimen, whereas without
IoMT the healthcare provider would have to take the patient’s word for it until their next
appointment or check-up. With IoMT, the quality of care is drastically enhanced from traditional
healthcare. Patients now have flexible options to continue treatment outside of the healthcare
facility. IoMT also allows the patient to signal an emergency and immediately notify healthcare
providers and emergency services [22].
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3.2 Efficiency of IoMT for Healthcare Providers

While IoMT helps patients receive quality care, IoMT can also be a powerful tool for healthcare
providers. IoMT can help with diagnosing conditions through real-time monitoring. Continuous
monitoring of a patient’s physiology can provide healthcare professionals with great insight into
a person’s health beyond what would have previously been possible. IoMT eases the burden of
healthcare workers by outsourcing treatment to RPM. It also relieves healthcare staff for inpatient monitoring by reducing the workload. An IoMT device automatically sensing and
sending biometric data of a patient reduces the need for physical or manual intervention,
allowing healthcare staff to focus on other aspects of their work.

IoMT also allows for easier and quicker access to data. Electronic health records (EHR) are
simpler to access with mobile apps. Mobile apps assist healthcare providers with precise
assessments, examinations, and diagnosing of patients [22]. It is no longer necessary for
healthcare professionals to keep track of physical bulky patient charts, all patient data can now
be stored and accessed through mobile apps. IoMT apps can also assist healthcare providers with
providing electronic educational information about conditions and treatments options [22]. A
medical reference guide can be in the application that healthcare providers use, providing quick
resources and information to healthcare professionals that may need it [22]. Additionally, IoMT
is cost-effective for healthcare providers as well. Leaning on IoMT resources reduces healthcare
costs for the healthcare business [22].
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3.3 Other Applications of IoT in Healthcare

There are other uses of IoT in healthcare that provide services other than direct medical care.
One example is wheelchair management [22]. Yang, et al. [23] propose a method for integrating
wheelchairs with IoT to assist people with disabilities and limited movement. By enabling IoT
capabilities on wheelchairs, there can be a closer watch on the vulnerable population to reduce
harm. A wheelchair can be equipped with sensors that can detect if an individual falls out of the
wheelchair or if the wheelchair rolls over [23]. The pressure sensors in the wheelchair
intelligently detect the wheelchair’s position and the person’s movement [23]. The collection of
sensors can communicate through a gateway, such as a smart phone, and send distress signals for
medical assistance [23].

An additional application of IoMT includes medication management. As Yang, et al. [24], have
proposed, a medication delivery system integrated with IoT enables real-time tracking of
medication called the iMedBox. The iMedBox is a medication box enabled with RFID tags,
WiFi, and WBSNs to track medication inventory, send reminders to patients, and record all
activity such as missing a dose and throwing away/destroying medication [24]. The iMedBox is
one prototype that could help patients with their medication tracking and relieve medication noncompliance, i.e., patients mismanaging and improperly handling medication.

Some major concerns regarding the applications of IoMT include security, privacy, and
compliance. IoT security is a major concern for hospitals and medical care facilities. The
healthcare sector has the highest number of breaches [25]. Indeed, from 2015 to 2019 the
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healthcare sector accounted for 76% of all breaches, well above the other sectors, with the
business and financial sector accounting for 9% [25].

The applications of IoMT are numerous. So long as there is interoperability, reliability, a
sufficient level of security and compliance, then IoMT will revolutionize the healthcare system
and reduce the burden of patient care on healthcare staff and shift that burden to technology.
Interoperability and reliability are contingent upon the architecture and mainly the
communication protocols of IoT. The heterogeneity of IoT does produce challenges with IoMT
implementation but understanding how the protocols operate is crucial to a successful IoMT
deployment.
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Chapter 4. The Protocols and Technologies of IoT

This chapter discusses some key protocols and technologies of IoT, how Bluetooth operates and
some of its major vulnerabilities, how IoT uses cellular network technologies such as LTE, and
how IoT requires lightweight encryption methods. The nuts and bolts of IoT are the protocols
that allows communication. Protocols are what makes IoT an intelligent operation.
Understanding the protocols is necessary to understand how to secure them. Security is a
necessary component of IoMT, so the vulnerabilities of technology such as Bluetooth is
important to understand. An overview of cellular technology is introduced, and lightweight
encryption methods are proposed.

4.1 Overview of Key Protocols: RFID, CoAP, MQTT, XMPP, AMQP, 6LoWPan

There are many protocols in IoT that have been developed to perform certain functions and meet
certain needs. The precursor to modern IoT protocols is RFID technology. Babu, et al. [1],
provides a detailed explanation: the way RFID works is an object is tagged with a chip that
provides the information about that object, which an RFID reader sends a query signal to. The
tag receives the signal and sends a reflection signal back to the reader. The transmission
exchange is sent to a database which confirms the identity of the object. RFID technology is
considered the first machine-to-machine (M2M) communication technology [1]. While RFIDs
are still useful, IoT has progressed to use more advanced protocols.
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One of the key protocols in the application layer of IoT architecture is the constrained
application protocol (CoAP). CoAP utilizes Representational State Transfer (REST) to provide
functionality through hyper-text transfer protocol (HTTP). REST is an architecture that provides
simple exchanges between client and server over HTTP using GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE
request methods [1]. HTTP is a request/response communication protocol widely used on the
internet and is often too dense and power consuming for IoT [26]. CoAP was designed by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Constrained RESTful Environments group (CoRE) to
provide lighter HTTP functionality [1]. CoAP essentially uses the HTTP request/response
method and shrinks it into a usable format for IoT.

A core difference between HTTP and CoAP is that HTPP runs on transmission control protocol
(TCP) while CoAP runs on user datagram protocol (UDP) [26]. TCP is a reliable protocol that
establishes connections between sender and receiver. UDP is unreliable and does not establish
connections between sender and receiver. The sender and receiver in TCP both establish that a
connection is occurring before data is transmitted and closes the connection, guaranteeing the
data will be sent and received.

In UDP, the connection is not established before data is transmitted, meaning that a packet may
not reach its destination. For this reason, UDP is considered unreliable. Although TCP is reliable,
it is slower than UDP because of the handshake process, i.e., confirming and closing the
connection. UDP also enables broadcast and multicast functionality. Broadcast communication
sends signals to all devices on the network and multicast sends signals to specific multiple
receivers. For these reasons, UDP is effective in IoT because of the simpler and lightweight
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communication. Thus, CoAP is an efficient protocol that adapts HTTP methods and reduces
HTTP to a smaller size. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the TCP and UDP processes and Figure 4.2
illustrates the CoAP architecture.

Figure 4.1: TCP Handshake Process vs UDP [27]

Figure 4.2: CoAP Architecture [28]

45
Another key protocol for IoT is message queue telemetry transport (MQTT). MQTT is another
protocol like CoAP, but a key difference is that it runs on TCP/IP rather than UDP. While CoAP
is based on a sender/receiver model, MQTT uses a publisher/subscriber model [26]. A
publisher/subscriber model differs from a sender/receiver model by the fact that there is no direct
connection between the publisher and the subscriber [26]. There is no handshake process, rather
the publisher and subscriber communicate through a broker who broadcasts messages to all
possible subscribers of a topic [26]. MQTT is a lightweight protocol for IoT that ensures
reliability through quality-of-service levels [26]. Figure 4.3 illustrates the MQTT
publisher/subscriber model.

Figure 4.3: MQTT Publisher/Subscriber Model [29]

Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP) is another message-based application layer
protocol that can use either the request/response or publish/subscribe models [26]. AMQP runs
on TCP [26]. Because of its security and reliability, AMQP is used in corporate environments
[26]. AMQP uses a messaging queue to provide efficient communication [26]. Another notable
application layer protocol is the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP).
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XMPP is decentralized and can be used with any operating system [1]. XMPP allows for
telecommunication methods such as multi-party, voice, and video chatting [1]. XMPP differs
from other protocols as it does not allow for machine-to-machine communication, but multiple
XMPP servers acknowledge each other over the same network [26].

IPv6 over low power wireless personal area networks (6LowPAN) is a standard for low power
and lossy networks (e.g., WSNs) [30]. IPv6 is a networking IP protocol that can be applied to
IoT. 6LowPAN allows for complete IP-based wireless sensor networks. Every sensor or node in
an IoT network has its own Ipv6 address and can connect directly to the internet creating a mesh
network [30]. It uses AES-128 encryption at the link layer but relies on upper layers for end-toend encryption [30].

These protocols and standards are key technologies for IoT. They are what allow IoT to function
as an intelligent system of communication. Understanding the protocols and how they work
helps with planning all aspects the IoT environment, especially security. There are many other
protocols and standards of IoT, but these are common and notable. The variance in protocols is
what makes interoperability difficult to achieve in an IoT environment. Ensuring each device can
communicate with one another while remaining secure is paramount. One of the more common
and ubiquitous standards for IoT is Bluetooth technology. Bluetooth is a part of almost every
smart device and allows for effective communication. Bluetooth is integral to IoT as there are a
plethora of implementations that utilize it.
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4.2 Bluetooth Technology

Bluetooth is an open standard that communicates through short range radio frequency [31].
Bluetooth is used primarily for WPANs and ad hoc networks [31]. Bluetooth is prolific and
exists in many consumer devices such as mice, keyboards, headsets, automobiles, printers,
speakers, medical devices, etc. [31]. Bluetooth requires two or more devices to establish
communication. Once the two (or more) devices are connected on the same channel and
frequency through the pairing sequence, the formed network between them is called a piconet
(tiny network) [31].

Bluetooth completely replaces cable connection by allowing wireless communication. For
example, a headset would traditionally have to be wired to a PC, but with Bluetooth the headset
can function wirelessly. Bluetooth also allows file sharing, synchronization, and internet
connectivity between devices [31]. There are different versions of Bluetooth which range from
the older version 1.0 to the current version 5.2. Every version of Bluetooth from 4.2 onwards is
considered Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [30].

Bluetooth uses the 2.4000 gigahertz (GHz) to 2.4835GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical
(ISM) frequency band [31]. Other standards use this band such as wireless local area networks
(WLANs), so interference can be an issue. To curb this: “Bluetooth employs frequency hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS) technology for transmissions. FHSS reduces interference and
transmission errors but provides minimal transmission security” [31]. Bluetooth Basic Rate (BR)
and Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) uses 79 different 1 megahertz (MHz) channels [31]. At each
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connection between devices, an available radio channel is selected by the FHSS process, and
each device changes to the appropriate channel to allow communication. The channel is not used
for long, and the channels repeatedly change to reduce interference and eavesdropping. This
process is repeated until the devices disconnect.

BLE uses the same frequency band but uses 40 channels of 2 MHz width rather than 79 channels
of 1 MHz width [31]. BLE also uses a time-division multiple access (TDMA) scheme to allow
multiple users to share the same channel by dividing the transmissions into time slots, the
sending device sending a packet at a predetermined time and the responding device responding
after a predetermined interval [31]. This scheme allows for low energy performance. Bluetooth
also utilizes a radio power measurement feature by automatically adjusting radio power based on
signal strength [31]. This feature allows for Bluetooth devices to consume less power or stay
within an agreeable range.

TDMA coupled with radio power measurement makes Bluetooth an excellent low-energy
communication method. The key differences of BLE compared to Bluetooth BR/EDR are lower
power consumption, lower memory needs, efficient communication methods, shorter packet
lengths, and simpler protocols [31]. While BLE is an incredible technology, security is a major
concern. There are also key differences between BR/EDR and BLE security features, mainly in
the pairing and encryption methods. Since most IoT devices are low-energy devices, this thesis
mainly explores the BLE security features and vulnerabilities. Table 4.1 below highlights the
differences between BR/EDR and BLE. The security, pairing, and encryption methods are
discussed in the following section.
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Table 4.1: BR/EDR vs BLE [31]
Characteristic

Bluetooth BR/EDR

Prior to 4.1

4.1 onwards

Bluetooth Low Energy

Prior to 4.2

4.2 onwards

RF Physical Channels

79 channels with 1 MHz channel
spacing

40 channels with 2 MHz channel
spacing

Discovery/Connect

Inquiry/Paging

Advertising

Number of Piconet Slaves

7 (active)/255 (total)

Unlimited

Device Address Privacy

None

Private device addressingavailable

Max Data Rate

1–3 Mbps

1 Mbps via GFSK modulation

Pairing Algorithm

Prior to 2.1:
E21/E22/SAFER+

P-256 Elliptic Curve, AES-128
HMAC-SHA-256

P-256 EllipticCurve,
AES- CMAC

2.1-4.0: P-192 Elliptic Curve9, HMAC-SHA-256
Device Authentication
Algorithm

E1/SAFER

HMAC-SHA-256

AES-CCM10

Encryption Algorithm

E0/SAFER+

AES-CCM

AES-CCM

Typical Range

30 m

50 m

Max Output Power

100 mW (20 dBm)

10 mW (10 dBm)11

4.3 Bluetooth Security and Vulnerabilities

Bluetooth has some built-in security standards for basic protection. There are five major security
services built into Bluetooth: authentication, confidentiality, authorization, message integrity,
and pairing/bonding [31]. BLE has four security modes each with additional levels in each
security mode. The least secure mode is security mode 1 which does not offer authentication or
encryption methods, while security mode 4 is the most secure as it offers both authentication and
encryption. BLE can use several different pairing methods, the two main ones are legacy pairing
and secure connection.
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Legacy pairing works by key generation and distribution over a key transfer protocol. When
pairing, the devices agree upon a temporary key (TK) whose value is determined by the pairing
algorithm to begin the process [31]. A short-term key (STK) is then created based on the TK to
encrypt the connection. The long-term key (LTK) – a key used for repeated encryption/
decryption – is then generated by one device and distributed to the other during pairing [31]. In
addition to the LTK, other cryptographic keys such as the Identity Resolving Key (IRK) and
Connection Signature Resolving Key (CSRK) are also generated and distributed through a key
transfer protocol [31].

The purpose of the IRK is to randomize the identity of a discoverable BLE device that can only
be discovered by the trusted BLE device. Without IRK, the BLE device advertising itself as
discoverable can be tracked by an adversary [31]. The CSRK is a key that authenticates the
sender of the data and provides data signing, protecting information sent over unencrypted links
[31]. Data signing is like a digital signature that proves it is the original and unaltered data,
comparable to a human signature to verify documentation. Thus, CSRK provides authentication
of the device and integrity of the data where the link is not encrypted [31]. Both keys are used to
protect information from MITM attacks. However, the issue with the legacy pairing method is
that unlike the pairing in the BR/EDR process, it does not use the Elliptic-Curve Duffie-Hellman
(ECDH) cryptographic method [31]. ECDH is a secure cryptographic key agreement method that
prevents MITM attacks and eavesdropping. Without ECDH, an LTK distribution in legacy
pairing of BLE can be “overheard” by a third party.
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Low energy secure connection is the other pairing method for BLE. Secure connection differs
from legacy pairing in that it uses ECDH cryptography during pairing. The key generation is also
different in that each BLE device generates its own LTK, rather than using the STK to generate
the LTK and distribute it through a key transfer protocol. This method is more secure and
provides protection against MITM attacks and eavesdropping by using ECDH cryptography and
generating an LTK independently [31]. Once the LTK is generated on each device, the link is
encrypted using the LTK and the IRK and CSRK are distributed [31]. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 on the
next page illustrate the pairing process of BLE legacy pairing and secure connection pairing,
respectively.

Figure 4.4: BLE Legacy Pairing [31]
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Figure 4.5: BLE Secure Connection Pairing [31]

There are four association models of pairing that both legacy pairing and secure connection use.
The four models are numeric comparison, passkey entry, just works, and out-of-band (OOB)
[31]. Each model is dependent upon the input/output (I/O) capabilities of the BLE device.

53
Numeric comparison works with secure connection pairing when both BLE devices have a
display screen with a form of input (e.g., keyboard) [31]. A 6-digit number is displayed on each
screen and the user must enter a “yes” response if the numbers match, if the user enters “no” then
the pairing fails [31]. Passkey entry works when one BLE device has a display but no input
capability, and the other has input capability but no display [31]. The BLE device with the
display shows a 6-digit number that is used to enter in the BLE device with input capability [31].
Just works was designed when one BLE device does not have a display and input capability.
Thus, the connection is accepted without confirming the value on both devices [31]. This makes
the just works model susceptible to MITM attacks since the devices are paired insecurely.

Out of band pairing is for BLE devices that pair through another wireless protocol other than
Bluetooth. The most common example of OOB pairing is near field communication (NFC),
where two BLE devices discover and exchange cryptographic information from being in
extremely close physical proximity to one another [31]. The user must then approve the
connection before pairing. The security level of OOB is dependent on the developer of the OOB
device, so MITM protection can be implemented [31]. A common example of NFC is current
debit/credit card technology where all that is required for a transaction is a tap of the card onto a
card reader. This capability is applicable to BLE for the pairing and key exchange process.

While BLE has some built in security to reduce MITM attacks and eavesdropping, there are still
vulnerabilities and threats to be aware of. The just works model of pairing is highly insecure as it
does not provide MITM protection, generating an unauthenticated key link [31]. It is also
important to ensure that the BLE devices use the same mode and level of security. Security mode
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4 devices can use lower security modes if the other BLE device does not support security mode
4. Lowering security modes poses risks as security mode 1 does not use any authentication or
encryption methods, leaving the device completely vulnerable to attackers.

Bluetooth uses challenge-response authentication. Each BLE device takes the role of claimant or
verifier; the claimant being the device proving its identity and the verifier confirming it by
verifying the secret Bluetooth link key [31]. Imagine that to get into a secure building, you (the
claimant) must know the secret password to verify that you are authorized to gain access. The
guard at the door (the verifier) must verify that you are allowed access. If you say the correct
secret password, you are allowed entry, and if you get it wrong you are denied. Bluetooth
challenge-response authentication in principle works similarly, although much more complex in
practice.

One issue with the challenge-response authentication process is that the challenge requests are
unlimited, which could potentially compromise the secret link key. A malicious attacker could
attempt to send multiple challenge requests repeatedly and potentially gather information about
the secret link key [31]. Link keys also need to be stored properly. Link keys can be read or
altered by an attacker if there are not sufficient access control mechanisms [31].

Another Bluetooth vulnerability is the lack of user authentication. While the devices
authenticate, there is no method within Bluetooth to ensure the correct user is the one pairing the
devices. There is also no end-to-end security innate to Bluetooth. Only the links are individually
authenticated andencrypted, and data is decrypted at the link layer before being sent up the layers
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[31]. End-to-end security methods to protect the data at every step must be employed by
additional securitycontrols on top of the Bluetooth protocol stack [31].

While Bluetooth is susceptible to general attacks like MITM, eavesdropping, denial of service
(DoS), etc., it also faces threats specific to Bluetooth. Bluesnarfing exploits firmware in older
Bluetooth devices that forces a connection [31]. The attacker can access all the information
stored on the victim device and can even route information to the malicious device [31].

Bluejacking is an attack that repeatedly sends messages or data to a device, usually a smart
phone. The messages themselves are not harmful, but bluejacking can still cause the device to
appear as it is malfunctioning. Bluejacking is akin to spam and phishing emails.

Bluebugging is an attack that is similar to bluesnarfing, it exploits firmware in older devices and
can “bug” the device, allowing the attacker to listen to transmissions and manipulate the device
[31]. BLE legacy pairing is also threatened by eavesdropping. An attacker can listen to the
device pairing and can determine the secret key given enough time [31]. This vulnerability
allows the attacker to impersonate a trusted device to the victim device. These vulnerabilities are
not exhaustive but are relatively common and easy to exploit by threats.

To mitigate Bluetooth threats and vulnerabilities, there are certain measures an organization
should consider before employing Bluetooth. Understanding the architecture and process of
Bluetooth is necessary to implement security measures. Bluetooth devices should also be
changed from their default settings to comply with the security policies [31]. Bluetooth devices
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should also remain at the lowest required power level and range to reduce the risk of detection by
an attacker [31]. The just works model of pairing should be avoided since it does not use
encryption or authentication to prevent MITM attacks. The devices without I/O capability should
not be used if there are other available devices that can use OOB, numeric comparison, or
passkey pairing models [31].

Bluetooth devices by default should remain undiscoverable until pairing to prevent discovery by
an attacker. Pairing should also be performed as little as possible and only when necessary. Link
encryption should always be active, and encryption should occur at every point of data
communication [31]. Encryption keys should also use the maximum length possible to protect
from brute force attacks, i.e., the longer the key size the more difficult it is to decipher [31].

As briefly mentioned earlier, BLE does not include end-to-end authentication and encryption, so
ensuring there is a method for application layer security is necessary for sensitive data.
Frequently patching devices is also crucial to ensure the device is up to date. Bluetooth should
also make use of multi-factor authentication and strong password requirements. Overall, BLE is
an efficient and decently secure standard for IoT, but it is not the only one. IoT devices can also
communicate through cellular networks, particularly long-term evolution (LTE).
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4.4 LTE Technology and Security

Many IoT devices, such as the two medical devices examined later in this paper, have wireless
cellular capability. Cellular networks are wireless networks that provide coverage for an area
using cellular sites made up of radio equipment [32]. A cellular site can be owned by a
telecommunications company, and internet service provider (ISP) or a government entity. The
owners of a cellular site are known as Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) [32]. The MNOs
distribute the radio equipment for cellular sites and connect them to a core network the MNO
operates [32].

LTE allows mobile devices to utilize IP networks for transmission. LTE provides mobility,
meaning that IP connectivity is maintained when moving from tower to tower [32]. LTE is useful
for IoT devices because it offers a mobile method of communication without requiring a
connection to WiFi or a wired network. The architecture of LTE includes the User Equipment
(UE), the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), the Evolved Packet
Core (EPC, also called the core network), and the IP network. Figure 4.6 illustrates the basic
architecture of LTE.

Figure 4.6: The Architecture of LTE [32]
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Mobile devices like smart phones and tablets in LTE networks are referred to as user equipment.
They are the predominant end points in LTE networks [32]. UE consists of the OS and a
hardware chip called the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) that is responsible for
accessing the cellular network [32]. The UICC runs a Java application called the Universal
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) that connects with the cellular radio and IP network [32]. To
identify a mobile device as a subscriber to the cellular network, LTE uses two methods: the
International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) and the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI). The IMEI is essentially a serial number for the mobile device and the IMSI is a
unique number assigned to the device’s UICC. The LTE network verifies the mobile device and
determines which services to provide through these methods.

The E-UTRAN is a mesh network of cell towers, known as base stations [32]. The E-UTRAN is
responsible for receiving radio signals from UE and translating them into IP packets to send to
the core network [32]. Base stations are enabled to hand off communication to one another based
on the UE location. This mobility provides seamless and uninterrupted connectivity. The EPC is
responsible for the routing and computing capability of LTE [32]. The connection between the
radio network and the EPC is called the backhaul [32]. There are many technical components to
the EPC that are beyond the scope of this paper. It is important to know that LTE has specific
protocols that operate on either the user plane or the control plane: “The user plane is the logical
plane responsible for carrying user data being sent over the network (e.g., voice communication,
SMS, application traffic) while the control plane is responsible for carrying all of the signaling
communication needed for the UE to be connected” [32].
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For LTE security, the UICC plays a major role. One of the functions of the UICC is to store
cryptographic keys and other credentials [32]. The UICC is provided with a long-term key
shared between the UICC and the MNO [32]. The long-term key is used to create other keys in
the cryptographic process [32]. LTE uses a variety of encryption methods, including AES-128
and AES-256. To authenticate a UICC on the LTE network, the Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol is used [32]. The AKA protocol verifies the long-term key shared
between the UICC and the MNO, providing authentication for the UICC on the LTE network
[32]. It is worthy to note that the UICC can be removed from the device, so the AKA cannot
authenticate the user or the device itself.

There are many threats and vulnerabilities in LTE networking due to the complex nature of
communication. The communication between the UE and base station is through radio frequency
over the air (also called the Uu interface), which is not always private [32]. The user plane
packets traveling through radio frequency do not have integrity protection [32]. Thus, the Uu
interface is vulnerable to eavesdropping. It is also an optional configuration for the packets in
both the user plane and control plane to provide confidentiality protection in the Uu interface,
this is for the operator of the LTE network to determine [32].

The IP communications from the base station to the core network can be intercepted if there are
no security measures. The use of security measures like IPsec between the base station and the
core network provides authentication, confidentiality, and integrity protection for IP packets
[32].
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IPsec is a security mechanism for IP networking that provides an encrypted connection through
the Authentication Header protocol (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [33]. The
authentication header protocol ensures the data is from its original source by using data integrity
checks [33]. The encapsulating security protocol encrypts the packet by using the Internet Key
Exchange protocol to determine how to protect the information being exchanged [33]. The IKE
sets the security associations, the parameters, and agreements on which algorithms, protocols,
and keys are used [33].

The UE themselves are susceptible to malware attacks. Malware can infect the OS of mobile
device and cause a loss of service [32]. Malware can also cause UE to be a part of a botnet
attack, forcing the UE to continually send requests over radio frequency to the E-UTRAN [32].
To reduce malware attacks, patching is important. Patching provides up-to-date protection of the
UE. Rogue base stations are also a threat to LTE security. A rogue base station is one that is not
owned or operated by an MNO [33]. The rogue base station can cause the UE to communicate
with it and force it to use a weaker cellular communication (e.g., 2G) [32]. Figure 4.7 illustrates a
downgrade attack.

Figure 4.7: Rogue Base Station Downgrade Attack [32]

61
There are several mitigation techniques that can be used to secure LTE. Cryptographic protection
can be enabled by the operator to prevent Uu interface eavesdropping [32]. Using IPsec for core
network and base station communication provides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication
[32]. Providing physical security of the UE and the core network infrastructure is important to
protect equipment. Patching the UE provides up-to-date protection to mitigate malware attacks.

The UICC can be protected by giving the UICC a PIN that only the user knows, this ensures that
the user is authenticated with the device [32]. There are also methods to detect rogue base
stations, such as providing a list of trusted base stations and allowing the user to determine if
they wish to connect [32].

LTE security is a complex issue that requires knowledge of IP networking and security because
of the integration with cellular communication. There are many points of access in LTE, from
the UE to the E-UTRAN to the core network. A communication chain is only as strong as its
weakest link, so protecting each point requires thorough consideration and knowledge. LTE
security is necessary, especially for sensitive information, such as ePHI.
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Chapter 5. Privacy and Security Concerns of IoT in Healthcare

This chapter explores the privacy and security concerns of ePHI in IoT. The collection of
personal information in IoT requires adequate protection. There are regulations in healthcare that
must be followed, such as HIPAA. The Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act) is a part of HIPAA that is necessary to understand as a part of
healthcare information technology. The risk of compromising ePHI is high. Violations of these
regulations can result in a range of punishments from fines to loss of licenses. It is in the best
interest of the healthcare organization to ensure there is adequate security protecting ePHI.

5.1 Overview of HIPAA Rules and ePHI

HIPAA is a federal law created in 1996 to provide a set of standards for protecting sensitive
patient information [34]. The goal of HIPAA is to prevent unwanted disclosure of protected
health information (PHI) of patients [34]. PHI consists of medical records and information that
can identify an individual (age, sex, height, weight, birth date, etc.). HIPAA protects patients by
enforcing regulations on covered entities. Covered entities are healthcare providers, healthcare
plan providers (i.e., entities that pay the cost of medical care), healthcare clearinghouses, and any
business associate (other persons or organizations that uses PHI to provide a service) [34]. The
privacy rule of HIPAA seeks to provide adequate protection of patient information while
enabling covered entities to transmit and access necessary patient information [34]. Striking a
balance between privacy and efficiency is a goal of the privacy rule of HIPAA.
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The HIPAA security rule is similar to the privacy rule, but it protects all PHI collected,
maintained, and transmitted in an electronic format (ePHI) [34]. Thus, the security rule does not
apply to any written or spoken PHI. The security rule addresses the administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards used to secure ePHI [35]. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
ePHI is necessary to maintain to remain compliant with HIPAA rules.

Administrative safeguards are policies and procedures of a covered entity that address the actions
taken to protect ePHI [35]. For example, staff training and education is an administrative
safeguard. Physical safeguards are the measures to protect the physical equipment from
unauthorized access [35]. An example of a physical safeguard is securing the computer systems
through an electronic badge reader to verify credentials. Technical safeguards are the most
complex and difficult to implement [35]. Technical safeguards encompass the technology and
practices used to secure ePHI. An example of a technical safeguard is using Virtual Private
Network (VPN) to securely transmit ePHI over an otherwise insecure network.

To maintain compliance with the HIPAA security rule, covered entities are also required to
conduct a risk assessment [35]. A risk assessment is used to evaluate the threat landscape of an
organization and implement security measures to mitigate risk. Each covered entity is different
and has its own set of policies, procedures, and infrastructure. HIPAA is not concerned with how
compliance is maintained, just that it needs to be, and it needs to be documented [35].
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5.2 The HITECH ACT

The HITECH Act was signed into law in 2009 as an additional act under HIPAA. The HITECH
Act was created to replace paper record with electronic health records (EHRs) [36]. Paper
records were largely inefficient and cumbersome when the technology for EHR was available,
albeit expensive. To assist with the adoption of EHRs, covered entities were given financial
incentives to transition to EHRs [36]. In addition to providing incentives, it also provided stricter
guidelines for HIPAA rules, ensuring that patients were notified of a violation and provided
harsher penalties for violations [36].

The financial incentives coupled with increased penalties strongly encouraged covered entities to
adopt EHRs. The civil penalties for a violation before the HITECH Act was a $100 fine per
violation up to a maximum of $25,000 [36]. The penalty system was revised with the HITECH
Act, creating tiers of penalties based on severity. The penalties are split into four tiers, tier 1
being the least egregious and tier 4 being the most. Tier 1 violations are those where a covered
entity is unaware of a HIPAA violation and would not have reasonably known [36]. Tier 4
violations are those where there is willful neglect of HIPAA rules and no corrective action to
rectify it within 30 days [36]. The maximum fine for a HIPAA violation was increased to $1.5
million [36]. Table 5.1 below illustrates the HIPAA violation tier system adjusted for inflation.
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Table 5.1: HIPAA Violation Tier System [35]
Culpability

Minimum
Fine/Violation

Maximum
Fine/Violation

Annual Penalty Cap

Tier 1:
No Knowledge
Tier 2:
Reasonable Cause
Tier 3:
Willful NeglectCorrected
Tier 4:
Willful Neglect–
Not Corrected

$120

$60,226

$1,806,757

$1,250

$60,226

$1,806,757

$12,045

$60,226

$1,806,757

$60,226

$1,806,757

$1,806,757

One of the major benefits of the HITECH Act was enforcing HIPAA rules on business associates
and crimping the loophole of plausible deniability [36]. Previously, covered entities could claim
that they were unaware that the business associate was not HIPAA compliant, avoiding the
sanction [36]. The HITECH Act curbed this by including the business associate as a covered
entity and enforcing HIPAA rules. Additionally, The HITECH Act made it mandatory for
covered entities to send a notification to those who had their information breached, known as the
Breach Notification Rule [36].

To improve transparency, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) created a list of covered entities who
had violated HIPAA rules and display it on their website [36]. The HITECH Act also increased
patient rights by allowing patients to access their EHRs and request copies [36]. The HITECH
Act is important for IoMT because it laid the groundwork for it to evolve. Since the Act caused
the transition of covered entities from paper records to EHRs, healthcare IT and technological
developments boomed. The HITECH Act also directly relates to IoMT because IoMT collects,
transmits, and stores ePHI. Thus, every covered entity that uses information relating to IoMT
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must remain HIPAA compliant. With the transition, it was necessary for covered entities to
improve their security measures to protect ePHI.

5.3 The Risk of Compromising ePHI

As with any information technology system, there will be a risk that data is breached or
compromised. In the healthcare setting, the risk is severe due to the sensitive, personal, and
financial information of people. According to NIST, risk is defined as: “a measure of the extent
to which an entity is threatened by potential circumstance or event and is typically a function of:
(i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the
likelihood of occurrence” [37]. Risk weighs the likelihood of an attack as well as the loss that
would occur if an attack occurred. There may be a high likelihood of an attack occurring, but if it
does not result in loss then the risk may be classified as low. It is important to understand that
risk varies for every organization. A threat for one entity may not be a threat for another.

The compromise of ePHI can be a disastrous situation for covered entities because of HIPAA
rules and potential sanctions that follow if there was a violation. Not only are there sanctions, but
there is a loss of reputation and trust with the people they service. Indeed, when conducting a
risk assessment, it is important to consider the impact a risk would have on community
perception and trust. HIPAA sanctions result in civil penalties and can also lead to criminal
penalties. If a healthcare professional knowingly uses patient data in a manner outside of HIPAA
guidelines, they are potentially susceptible to criminal penalties [38]. Examples of criminal
HIPAA violations are stealing patient data for profit and disclosing PHI with malicious intent.
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Table 5.2: HIPAA Criminal Penalty Tiers
Tier 1

No knowledge of violation

Up to 1 year in jail

Tier 2

Obtaining PHI under false

Up to 5 years in jail

pretenses
Tier 3

Obtaining PHI for personal

Up to 10 years in jail

gain or with malicious intent

Some of the most common HIPAA violations are snooping on ePHI/PHI, failure to conduct risk
assessment/management, denying patients’ access to records, lack of ePHI controls
(authorization), failure to encrypt or otherwise protect ePHI, wrongful disclosure of PHI, and
improper disposal of PHI [38]. It is common that a covered entity that lacks a risk assessment
and risk management process and is subjected to sanctions and must take corrective action. At
the individual level, snooping and wrongful disclosure occur frequently [38]. HIPAA rules do
not require encryption to be used for ePHI but covered entities must have an equally sufficient
method for protection [38]. For IoMT, having sufficient ePHI controls and encryption are the
most important. With the many points of transmission and routes ePHI can take in IoMT, it is
imperative that covered entities have measures in place to protect ePHI in IoMT.

A case in 2020 shows the importance of safety measures. An ambulance company lost an
unencrypted laptop containing ePHI of over 500 patients [39]. In the ensuing investigation, it
was found that the ambulance company were in violation of multiple HIPAA rules. [The
ambulance company] “had not conducted a comprehensive, organization-wide risk analysis (45
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C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)), had not implemented a security awareness training program for
its employees (45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)), and had failed to implement HIPAA Security Rule
policies and procedures (45 C.F.R. § 164.316)” [39]. The OCR aided the company, but despite
the help it was found that the ambulance company had not taken meaningful action to correct the
problem resulting in a fine of $65,000 [39]. In addition, the ambulance company was placed
under HIPAA scrutiny for two years to ensure they maintained compliance [39].

There are many points of attack in a healthcare setting that make it difficult to protect. From
phishing and social engineering that obtain user credentials for unauthorized access, to
ransomware that holds information hostage until a dollar amount is paid, there are many threats
to assess in the healthcare setting. With IoMT becoming ubiquitous, this risk is amplified. Not
only is the healthcare organization concerned with their information systems, but in the case of
remote patient monitoring, now the patients themselves must be aware of potential cyber threats.
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Chapter 6. Implementation of IoMT on Real Devices

This chapter is the examination of two implementations of IoMT. First, I will describe how the
IoMT implementations work and then present my answers to the research questions. The
LifeWatch Mobile Cardiac Telemetry 3 Lead (MCT3L) device, and the remote patient
monitoring system from Vivify Health are the two IoMT applications I selected as research
subjects for this thesis.

6.1 Research Questions on IoMT Implementation

1. What communication protocol does the IoT device use (Bluetooth, WiFi, Cellular, etc.)?
If they use Bluetooth, which version?
2. What data protocol does the IoT device use (CoAP, MQTT, AMQP, etc.)?
3. What encryption methods do they use for data-at-rest and data-in-transit, if any?
4. Is biometric data stored locally on the IoT device? If so, is it encrypted?
5. What security measures does the IoT device manufacturer/provider implement (e.g.,
multi-factor authentication, use of secure cloud, etc.)?
6. What are the current security controls used to protect these IoT devices?
7. What does the IoMT architecture look like?
8. What are some of the risks if the device is compromised?
9. Are there any security flaws in protecting these IoT devices?
10. To improve the security of these IoT devices, what are some suggestions to protect these
IoT devices?
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6.2 LifeWatch Mobile Cardiac Telemetry 3 Lead (MCT3L)

The MCT3L device is a device for continuous ECG monitoring and arrythmia detection [40].
This device is issued to patients with symptoms of cardiac arrythmia for remote monitoring [40].
The device monitors patient ECG and automatically detects cardiac arrythmia based on an
algorithm, which alerts the patient and records the data [40]. Arrythmia events can also be
recorded manually by the patient and transmits the ECG data to a monitoring center [40]. The
monitoring center then presents the data to the healthcare provider [40]. The following figure
from the Patient User Guide illustrates and describes the equipment.

Figure 6.1: LifeWatch MCT3L Equipment [40]
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The monitor, which is a handheld device, received the ECG data from the sensor via Bluetooth
[40]. The monitor can also store up to 30 days of data [40]. The monitor runs on a proprietary
application that translates the ECG data and sends it over cellular networks to the monitoring
center [40]. The sensor records and transmits ECG data to the monitor [40]. The sensor is battery
powered (3.6V AA lithium-thionyl chloride) and uses four disposable electrodes that are placed
on specific areas of the human body which connect to the sensor’s lead wires [40]. The three
figures below illustrate the MCT3L system. Figure 6.2 illustrates the sensor, wires, monitor, and
electrodes. Figure 6.3 illustrates the electrode placement. Figure 6.4 illustrates the
communication between the sensor and monitor.

Figure 6.2: MCT3L Components [41]

Figure 6.3: MCT3L Electrode Placement [41]
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Figure 6.4: MCT3L Communication [41]

Since the sensor and monitor communicate via Bluetooth, they must be in a specific range of
each other (30 feet) for data to be transmitted to the monitor. The sensor also has a flash buffer
memory for storage, a specialized circuit for ECG signals, a Bluetooth transceiver, and a buzzer
[40]. The sensor can loop up to 6 hours of ECG recordings in the flash memory to preserve the
data when the Bluetooth link to the monitor is down (e.g., out of range) [40].

The MCTL3 uses the Bluetooth serial port profile (SPP), which emulates a serial cable
connection between two devices. I was unable to determine which exact version of Bluetooth the
devices use. However, SPP is based off the RFCOMM protocol, which is a simple transport
protocol that is unsupported by BLE, thus the devices use Bluetooth classic.

6.3 Answering Research Questions for the LifeWatch MCT3L Device

As mentioned earlier, the MCT3L uses the SPP of Bluetooth classic to communicate between the
monitor and the sensor. The monitor sends the ECG data over cellular networks (LTE) to
transmit the data in the form of IP packets to the monitoring center. There is no information in
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the user guide about a data protocol but based on the information given, it does not use a data
protocol. The entire system of the MCT3L is a WBAN that transmits ECG data from the monitor
solely through cellular networks, where Bluetooth collects information from the sensor and LTE
does the legwork for communication to the monitoring center.

The Patient User Guide does not discuss encryption methods, but it is safe to determine that data
stored on the sensor until a Bluetooth link with the monitor is established is not encrypted. The
reason being that the sensor is a low-power device that uses flash memory to store the ECG data.
The sensor likely does not have the computational power required to perform encryption.

For data-in-transit, the data is encrypted using the LTE standards. It is worth noting that it is
unknown if the data is encrypted while being transmitted to the base station; the data may only
be encrypted from base station onward to the core network by the default LTE standard.

The first-time set up for the MCT3L requires the patient to call a LifeWatch technician for set
up. Based on this information, it is safe to assume that the technician must approve the user and
activate the device. Once the device is activated, however, there is no password protection to
access the monitor. This is because the monitor and sensor are on 24/7 for the entire time the
devices are being used (30 days).

This device and user are approved by the LifeWatch technician for set-up, but there are no
following security controls to authorize the user. There is nothing to ensure that the intended
patient is the one using the device. Hypothetically, a curious relative of the patient could equip
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the electrodes and sensor, providing inaccurate ECG data of the intended patient. There is no
encryption at rest due to the continuous monitoring and communication between the monitor and
sensor.

The MCT3L devices send data over cellular networks, where LifeWatch collects the data and
presents it to the healthcare providers, where they have a portal to access. The healthcare
network authorizes the communication between itself and the telehealth provider. The firewall
must be configured to allow traffic from the telehealth provider into the private hospital network.

The risk if the device is compromised is high. The device being compromised can result in the
violation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, resulting in loss of trust from the patient
and other potential penalties. MITM attacks, eavesdropping, ransomware, and phishing are all
threats that could exploit a vulnerability in the device or user, leading to severe negative
outcomes such as loss of trust and financial loss.

Because the device uses Bluetooth classic instead of BLE, it lacks some of the key security
features that BLE inherently provides. The device likely pairs with the just works association
model because of the lack of I/O capability in the sensor. If this is the case, it does not provide
any MITM protection. It is also susceptible to botnet and DoS attacks because of the simple
Bluetooth communication. A DoS attack would greatly impact the service of the device. Other
major flaws include a lack of encryption for data stored in the sensor. This data could potentially
be seen or stolen by an attacker if they can force the sensor to pair with the attacker
(bluensarfing/bluejacking). It is unknown what security parameters are initiated upon set-up with
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the technician. It is possible the sensor is programmed to only trust the monitor in the initial
pairing, but a competent attacker could still forcibly pair with the sensor.

This device is outdated and thus highly susceptible to common Bluetooth attacks. The
organization should use a modern Bluetooth device that is BLE capable. BLE provides more
inherent protection and additional security measures can be added on top of BLE. While BLE is
still vulnerable, it is considerably more secure than Bluetooth classic. If not BLE, at the very
least increase the security level/mode and use a different pairing scheme other than just works.

It is suggested to use a different sensor that has the computing power to encrypt the ECG data-atrest and allow for additional encryption for data-in-transit and allow for a different pairing
scheme. Lightweight encryption methods exist, such as the Lightweight Encryption Algorithm
(LEA) for WBANs [42]. It is also suggested to include password protection, ideally multi-factor
authentication (MFA) for the monitor. Password protection with MFA reduces the likelihood that
someone other than the intended patient is using the device.

6.4 Vivify Health Remote Patient Monitoring System

The Vivify Health RPM system includes a Samsung Galaxy Tab E 32GB tablet, and three BLE
capable sensing devices: a sphygmomanometer, a pulse oximeter, and a weight scale. The
sphygmomanometer is used to detect blood pressure, the pulse oximeter measures the amount of
oxygen in the blood, and the weight scale detects weight by standing on it. The
sphygmomanometer provides the patient with a blood pressure cuff and collects the reading. The
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pulse oximeter is a Bluetooth device that the patient places on their finger. Light beams from the
pulse oximeter read the oxygen levels without having to draw blood. The weight scale records
the weight after use. Figure 6.5 below illustrates the RPM kit.

Figure 6.5: Vivify Health Remote Patient Monitoring Kit [43]

The sensing devices collect biometric data and send it via cellular network or WiFi to the
telehealth provider, Vivify Health, who presents the data to the healthcare organization. The
Samsung tablet houses the applications for the devices and acts as the gateway for
communication. Specifically, the Samsung tablet receives biometric readings from the medical
devices using Bluetooth 4.0. Then, the biometric data is sent to the servers using RESTful API
services. The data is encrypted at rest using AES-256 and protected using TLS while in transit.
TLS is the security protocol used in HTTPS to ensure internet communication is encrypted. The
data is stored and encrypted on the device until confirmed it has been received by the server.
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Bluetooth connectivity is password protected and OAuth 2.0 Token authentication is used to
secure the servers. OAuth 2.0 is a protocol that allows a user to permit a third-party access to
protected resources.

There are four roles in the OAuth 2.0 process. The resource owner is the owner of the protected
resource (in this case Vivify Health) who authorizes an application to access the account [44].
The client is the one making access requests to access the protected resources [44]. The
authorization server issues the access tokens after authenticating the resource owner and grants
authorization to the client [44]. The resource server is the server housing the protected resources
[44]. The resource server responds to requests using access tokens [44]. In this case, Vivify
Health is the resource owner and the client requesting access is the healthcare organization. The
OAuth 2.0 token process provides secure access by authenticating Vivify Health as the resource
owner and authorizing the healthcare organization. Figure 6.6 illustrates the OAuth2.0 protocol.

Figure 6.6: The OAuth 2.0 Protocol [45]
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In addition to the OAuth 2.0 protocol, a 4-digit PIN code is required to login to the device and all
devices are locked down using Mobile Management Software. The risk of the RPM system being
compromised is moderate. There are security measures in place like encrypting data-at-rest and
in-transit that reduce the likelihood of a breach. The devices all use a modern version of
Bluetooth (BLE) which bolsters the security compared to Bluetooth classic. BLE ensures there is
MITM protection, and the devices securely authenticate one another. However, if the RPM
system is compromised through phishing, ransomware, or other common methods, it could result
in a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. There is a plethora of sensitive information
that could result in loss of patient trust.

While the devices communicate vie BLE, the Samsung tablet is WiFi capable, meaning that the
information is being sent from the patients’ home network or other insecure networks depending
on the patient’s location. A home network may not be configured to provide the best possible
security, so to solve this problem it is possible to segment the patient home network from the
RPM devices. End-to-end protection is vital for an RPM system to ensure utmost security of
sensitive data.

Separating other devices in a home network from RPM devices can be accomplished with using
a layer 2 over 3 solution, this secure separation is called an enclave [46]. Layer 2 refers to the
data link layer (e.g., ethernet) in the OSI model and layer 3 is the networking layer (e.g., router).
Cawthra, et al. [46], have emulated this by creating a lab that segmented patient home networks.
Threats to home networks can be mitigated, preventing unauthorized remote access to RPM
devices. The layer 2 over 3 solution would be provided by the telehealth provider (i.e., Vivify
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Health). The provided solution could be a secure gateway that provides layer 2 over layer 3
security. The enclave solution ensures the RPM devices in the patient home network remains
separated and inaccessible from the rest of the patient home network.

The Samsung tablet also uses weak password protection. The tablet should use a PIN longer than
4 digits and include MFA. This would ensure that the tablet itself is more secure from physical
tampering, in the case it is lost or stolen. While data-at-rest is encrypted, it is still undesirable for
the tablet to be accessible to someone other than the intended patient. No data is stored on the
sensing devices. All biometric data is communicated via BLE to the Samsung tablet. The tablet
has plenty of storage space for data and computing power to perform encryption.
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Chapter 7. Solutions and Countermeasures for IoT Security Issues

This chapter explores some additional security countermeasures that are useful for IoT.
Understanding the device manufacturer’s role in security, establishing security policies and
procedures, and providing education and awareness of all users are all countermeasures that can
make IoT a secure environment. Lightweight encryption methods are being developed to help
ease the burden of computational power, and with the advent of blockchain technology, IoT data
can be secured with it. The cloud is also a useful tool for IoT security. Using a private cloud to
house the enormous amount of IoT data provides convenience for authorized parties.

7.1 General Security Countermeasures
7.1.1 Manufacturer’s Responsibility

Currently, there is a huge gap in security in the development of IoMT devices. According to a
survey by the HIPAA Journal [47], approximately half of the device manufacturers stated that
security is considered as a factor during the design process. The majority (82%) of the
manufacturers stated that they have major security concerns and felt that safeguards were lacking
to protect from an attack [47]. Every IoMT device on the market must meet certain criteria by the
FDA to be approved and deployed. It is the manufacturer’s responsibility to provide certain
security countermeasures innately to ensure compliance. The manufacturer must understand the
purpose of the IoMT device, the type of information it will collect, and the environment it will be
operating in. It is the manufacturer’s responsibility to adequately develop and prepare IoMT
devices for deployment. Understanding the needs of the clients/customers is necessary.
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Manufacturers must address risk and risk mitigation techniques such as asset management,
access management, vulnerability management, data protection, and incident protection [48].

Asset management is maintaining an accurate record and inventory of all IoT devices throughout
the deployment life cycle [48]. This is important to ensure accountability of IoT devices. Access
management is preventing unauthorized access of the physical device. Restricting access to IoT
interfaces and applications mitigates risk of compromise [48]. The manufacturer can implement
access management by providing rules to access applications and include MFA to access the
device.

Vulnerability management is the general upkeep of the device, such as patching that provides upto-date security and fixes operational issues [48]. Data protection refers to methods to protect
data-at-rest and data-in-transit (e.g., encryption) to prevent exposure of sensitive information
(e.g., ePHI) [48]. Incident detection is the monitoring of IoT device activity to detect any
security breaches or compromise of data [48]. These are mitigation areas that manufacturers
must keep in mind while developing IoT devices, especially in the medical field where sensitive
personal information is collected. A lack of security in IoMT can lead to severe penalties from
HIPAA, as exemplified by the case described previously in section 5.3. In that case, the HIPAA
penalty was severe, they were fined above the minimum fine for tier 4 violations and were
placed under scrutiny of the OCR for two years. This penalty greatly impacted the company
financially with the fine and operationally by requiring OCR oversight. This case shows why
proper security measures are important to maintain HIPAA compliance.
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7.1.2 Robust Security Policies and Procedures

Creating guidelines for IoT device and information use is necessary, especially in the medical
field. Having rules in place that dictate who can access what and for what purpose prevents
unauthorized access and reduces the likelihood of the IoT device or information being
compromised. Each covered entity in the healthcare sector that interacts with IoMT devices or
information must follow HIPAA rules. To reach and maintain compliance, policies and
procedures are written to provide rules and guidelines. A hypothetical policy example follows;
only certified and authorized physicians may access the EHR of patients that use RPM systems.
The physician must swipe their badge and provide a password to enter the EHR. This policy
states that a) only authorized physicians may access the EHR of RPM patients and b) they must
provide multiple active credentials in the form of electronic badge and password. This example
policy reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access by dictating who can access the EHR and
how to access it.

Other policies and procedures may go more in depth into the technical details, such as encryption
methods. It is worth noting that not only would the healthcare organization implement policies
and procedures, but also the telehealth provider. All RPM information is first sent to the
telehealth provider for processing and presentation before the healthcare provider can access it.
Each covered entity must have a robust security policy that provides rules and guidelines for
security countermeasures.
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7.1.3 Network Segmentation/Hardening

As mentioned earlier, network segmentation is useful for separating the RPM environment from
a home network. Network segmentation is a useful security measure for the telehealth provider
and the healthcare provider as well. Segmenting the EHR from the rest of the network provides
additional security so that the ePHI cannot be accessed from within the main hospital network.
Network hardening refers to security countermeasures that bolster network security. Network
hardening can mean that firewall rules are configured more strictly to prevent additional traffic.
Closing certain ports and using demilitarized zones (DMZs) to protect the internal network
provides additional security. DMZs are used to separate the internal network from the public
internet by housing the external-facing servers between firewalls. Disabling unused network
services, implementing intrusion detection and prevention systems are all countermeasures to
harden a network.

For IoMT, the best security countermeasures possible should be implemented to reduce the risk
that ePHI is intercepted, manipulated, or stolen. These methods are commonly recommended and
provide robust network security. Hardening and segmenting networks reduces the risk of
common attacks like DoS attacks. An intrusion prevention system and advanced firewalls can
prevent DoS and botnet attacks from disrupting services. If an attack like DoS does occur, a
hardened network would be able to respond faster to these threats, reducing loss.
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Network segmentation provides an additional layer of security around the network's perimeter.
This is how businesses can provide guest WiFi services without risking the protected resources.
Network segmentation can be accomplished by physically separating the network, or logically
with virtual local area networks (VLANS) to automatically route traffic to the correct subnet.
Network segmentation should be used in healthcare to include IoMT devices. This will provide a
secure perimeter in the healthcare organization's network to protect the information collected and
sent by IoMT devices. IoMT information should be considered as a protected resource since it is
ePHI. As suggested in this work, the patient’s home network should be considered as a potential
vulnerability. Providing a segmented network for the patient’s IoMT devices can ensure that
ePHI is secure. This is accomplished through a physical appliance to segment the IoMT
resources. For the MCT3L and the RPM kit, implementing network hardening techniques will
better protect the ePHI when accessed by the telehealth provider and the healthcare organization.
The goal of network hardening/segmentation is to reduce the attack surface, thus reducing risk.

7.1.4 IoMT Security Training and Education

An administrative measure for securing IoMT, and just as important as technical and physical
security countermeasures, is creating some means of IoMT training and education for staff.
Healthcare professionals must have awareness of the risks involved with IoMT and understand
that ePHI is necessary to protect. A covered entity should have training and awareness for its
employees to always keep security in the forefront. For example, simulating phishing by sending
emails organization wide can keep staff alert. Educating staff on what phishing looks like and
how to report it can mean the difference between a hefty HIPAA fine and successfully protecting
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ePHI.

Education and training go hand in hand with security policies and procedures. There must be
policies for keeping staff up to date on security awareness and training. New threats and
vulnerabilities arise constantly, so making sure staff is on the current level regarding security
policies and procedures is a part of securing IoMT. It is not expected that clinical staff be IT and
cybersecurity experts, rather they must have a general understanding of HIPAA rules, the risk if
ePHI is compromised, and the relevant security countermeasures they need to take to safeguard
ePHI.

IoMT has many threats looking to exploit it, so having some knowledge of what adversaries are
intending to do and what attacks can look like can reduce the likelihood of an attack or breach.
Indeed, in the year 2019, 82% of healthcare organizations experienced a cyberattack on an IoT
device [47]. The largest threat of these attacks was theft of patient data [47]. Theft of patient data
can occur at many points in the IoMT environment. In the case of the LifeWatch MCT3L, patient
data could be compromised if the sensor is lost or stolen, and the physical memory is accessed.
There could also be MITM attacks during Bluetooth communication, intercepting the ECG data.
In the Vivify Health RPM system, communications over an insecure WiFi network could be
intercepted.
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7.2 Lightweight Security Protocols for IoT

Lightweight security countermeasures are currently being developed to further protect
information on resource constrained IoT devices. Glissa and Meddeb [30] propose a lightweight
version of IPsec for IoT devices, called 6LowPsec, and end-to-end security solution for 6LowPan
IoT devices. The purpose of 6LowPSec is to provide end-to-end security that reliably delivers
time sensitive data in resource constrained environments while reducing overhead and
computational requirements [30].

As mentioned earlier, there is a lack of end-to-end security in IoT devices, but the 6LowPsec
protocol provides higher security for 6LowPan devices. 6LowPsec security features include data
confidentiality and integrity through key association and management using AES-128.
6LowPsec also employs intrusion detection for advanced security [30]. The performance
evaluation of 6LowPsec showed that it is an efficient protocol for 6Lowpan security. It replaces
the need for upper layer security protocols while remaining lighter than IPsec. The lightweight
encryption algorithm (LEA) for IoMT WBANs described by Alshamsi, et al. [42], encrypts
biometric data gathered from a sensor before sending it to the mobile device. LEA is a block
cipher that uses 128, 192, and 256 key sizes, the same as AES, but the number of rounds is 24,
28, and 32 [42]. The AES algorithm goes through 10 rounds for a 128-bit key, 12 for a 192-bit
key, and 14 for a 256-bit key before the final encryption output is produced. The number of
rounds is significantly higher for LEA, but the encryption round process is lighter. Indeed, LEA
is approximately 1.5 to 2 times faster than AES [42]. Currently, there are also no known
successful attacks on LEA [42] making it a highly secure and viable alternative to the
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mainstream AES algorithm. LEA is a solution for low power and resource constrained IoT
devices that require confidentiality (e.g., the LifeWatch MCT3L sensor).

7.3 Technologies in Cloud Computing and Blockchain Used for IoT Security

An overview of the cloud for IoT was discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.3, but the cloud for IoT
truly shines as a security tool. The cloud can provide secure storage for IoT data in a private
cloud, i.e., a cloud that is only accessible by authorized users. Mechanisms such as Amazon’s
Web Services simple storage service (S3) allows for scalable and secure storage of data. Any file
can be stored in what’s known as a bucket, a container for data [49]. AWS provides identity and
access management to ensure safe storage of data. For example, public access to S3 buckets is
automatically blocked by default [49]. In addition to secure storage, AWS also offers tools to
monitor the activity of an S3 bucket [49]. AWS CloudTrail provides detailed logs of activity
[49]. S3 is just one example of a solution for IoT data storage security. There are plenty of other
cloud options available depending on need.

Blockchain technology is a unique system of data storage. Blockchain is a decentralized
distributed ledger that secures data through cryptography and hashing algorithms [50]. Each
node in a blockchain is signed with the previous block’s hash, forming a peer-to-peer database
[50]. Blockchains are decentralized because of the nature in which they store data and perform
transactions; they do not require a third-party to verify the trust between blockchain nodes [50].
Trust between nodes is verified by all other nodes, i.e., every transaction in a blockchain is
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shared between every block [50].

For IoT, a blockchain can be a useful security measure in that it reduces the likelihood of a
breach because of a third-party’s lack of security. All the information gathered from IoT devices
can be cryptographically stored in a blockchain. In a setting where privacy is crucial, such as the
medical field, a blockchain can provide the necessary security and privacy. The source of the
transaction in a blockchain remains anonymous. The data in a blockchain is immune to change
because each block relies on all previous blocks using hashing algorithms to secure the data [50].

Blockchains eliminate the need for an intermediary or third-party auditing to verify the data;
blockchains are a self-sustaining secure database. Since IoT suffers from heterogeneity,
blockchain provides a decentralized system for IoT devices that would otherwise have security
issues in centralized storage. Adopting blockchains in IoT to manage the numerous transactions
in IoT environments would also reduce the costs with maintaining a centralized data storage
center [50]. Blockchains could be the next step to making IoT a universal seamless service.

One of the key issues with blockchains is that since it is a recent technology, there is a lack of
regulations and guidelines [50]. This is important for manufacturers of IoT devices because they
may need to meet certain criteria from regulatory bodies (e.g., the FDA) for approval. Another
challenge of blockchains in the medical field is providing access of medical records to patients.
A private blockchain would be necessary for healthcare and granting patients access to their
medical records stored in a blockchain could be complicated. The blockchain would also have to
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comply with HIPAA rules for security and privacy.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion

The purpose, architecture, and applications of IoT has been described and the implementation of
real IoMT devices has been scrutinized. Key technologies such as Bluetooth and LTE were
described as well as the threats and vulnerabilities of those standards. The main contributions of
this thesis consist of the solutions to improve IoMT cybersecurity countermeasures and HIPAA
compliance.

The two IoMT implementations examined in this thesis revealed important aspects of
cybersecurity in IoMT. Both implementations examined lack critical cybersecurity
countermeasures. There must be physical, technical, and administrative countermeasures to
safeguard IoMT devices and ePHI. HIPAA rules apply to IoMT, and every covered entity must
maintain compliance. IoT security must be improved if it is to remain the future of the internet.
Future work may consist of examining advanced IoMT devices as the standards develop, as
well as comparing the efficiency and security of new encryption methods to IoMT devices.
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